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It is a thesis of this article that the Bill of Rights in the Constitution facilitated the 
practice of federal judicial review. There were no explicit statements about review 
in the Bill of Rights but it conditioned the federal judieiary to exercise it. The po­
tential of the Bill of Rights for inereasing the role of the federal judieiary was not 
elear. But in the context of both the written and the unwritten dimension of the 
Constitution and the question whether the latter could be made positive law, the 
role of the Bill of Rights for judicial review of federal power became visible. The 
role of the Ninth Amendment was especially important here.
1. The origins of the Bill of Rights
The origins of the Bill of Rights go back to the political fight between the Federal- 
ists and the Antifederalists. The core of the Antifederalists’ argument was best 
formulated by Brutus for whom the Constitution will not be a compact entered into 
by states and as such cannot succeed without a sacrifice o f  your liberties. What 
was needed then was the instrument found in every free govemment... a declara­
tion o f rights. For Brutus, the major task of the Constitution’s framers was to limit 
and defme its powers... and guard against abuse o f  authority... The principles... 
upon which the social compact isfounded, ought to have been clearly and precisely 
stated and the most express and fid l declaration o f  rights to have been made... 
[and] on this... there is... a... silence\ For the Antifederalists all state constitutions 
were either based on the bill of rights or had express reservations of rights included 
among the provisions of them.
1 H. S to r in g ,  The Complete Anti-Federalist, Chicago 1981, vol. 2, p. 9, 150, 36, 23, 25.
The Antifederalists refuted a crucial argument of the Federalists that the 
Bill of Rights was not necessary sińce the federal govemment was strictly of dele- 
gated powers. For them the powers of the federal govemment were total with re­
spect to every object to which they extend as that o f  any State govemment. It 
reaches to every thing which concerns human happiness2. The Antifederalists 
thought that sińce the federal Constitution was the supreme law and sińce the na­
tional govemment moved towards consolidation, the efficacy of State bills of rights 
was negligent. The Federalists essentially agreed with the Antifederalists’ concept 
of the bill of rights under the state constitutions. Bills of rights reserved certain 
natural rights and those not explicitly reserved were transferred to the omnipotent 
legislature vested with generał powers. What divided both camps was not the un- 
derstanding of the Bill of Rights but the ąuestion who were the parties to the Con­
stitution. The Antifederalists accused the Federalists of breaking the instructions in 
the Philadelphia Convention and not revising the Articles of Confederation but 
destroying the social contract of the original states.
According to the Antifederalists the Confederation was thrown back to the 
State of naturę in which the individuals again were writing a new social contract of 
which the new Constitution was an outcome, a repetition on a Continental scalę of 
the social contracts which created the states. Both the federal and the state consti­
tutions were formed by the individuals and had to have the Bill of Rights reserving 
rights of persons outside of power of govemment. Thus, without the Bill of Rights 
the federal govemment would acquire an absolute power3.
The Federalists dismissed the argument that the new govemment was 
formed by individuals. “The people” created the Constitution not as an assemblage 
of individuals but in James Wilson’s term “assemblage of societies”4. The federal 
Constitution was only -  as James Madison stated -  a Bill o f Powers [that] needs no 
bill o f  Rights5. It was an instrument of enumerated, or limited powers only, the 
remainder being retained by the people and the states. For Alexander Hamilton the 
bill of rights would be dangerous... would contain... exceptions to the powers which 
are not granted; and... would afford a... pretext to claim more than were granted... 
why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to dob. For the 
Antifederalists the powers of the federal govemment were in fact unlimited and the 
govemment headed towards consolidation. The instruments of consolidation were 
inherent in the Preamble and the fuzzy provisions of the congressional article. The 
Federalists finally agreed to the Bill of Rights, but its structure and content were 
different from the premises on which the Antifederalists wanted them to be based.
2 Ibidem, p. 2, 9, 26.
3 See H. S to r in g ,  op. cii., p. 4, 3, 7, 3, 11, 4, 6, 51; M. F a r ra n d ,  The Records o fth e  Federal Conven- 
lion, New Haven 1966, vol. 3, p. 192-193.
4 Federalisl 39, [in:] The Federalisl Papers, ed. C. R o s s  i te r , New York 1961, p. 243.
5 The Papers o f  James Madison, ed. R. A. R u t la n d , Chicago 1979, vol. 12, p. 194.
6 Federalist 84, [in:] The Federalist Papers... p. 513; The Documentary History o fth e  Ratifiration o fth e  
Constitution, eds. M. J e n s e n ,  J. P. K a m iń s k i ,  G. J. S a la d in o ,  “State Historical Society of Wisconsin” 1976, 
vol. 2, p. 167-168.
a) James Madison, the real author of the federal Bill of Rights, structured it not as 
a list of absolute, natural rights, but as social or civil rights. As such they were 
consistent with the Federalists’ notion of the Constitution of 1787 as being formed 
not by the individuals leaving the state of naturę but by the people through the state 
govemments. For the Federalists natural rights of the individuals leaving the state 
of naturę were the province of the states. Such rights usually formed preambles to 
them. That is why, preparing the federal Bill of Rights, Madison disregarded these 
portions of the state bills of rights which contained certain natural rights o f  which 
men, when they form  a social compact cannot deprive... their posterity, among 
which are the enjoyment o flife  and liberty... property, and pursuit... o f  happiness. 
Madison omitted the phrase “natural rights” from the federal Bill of Rights, strip- 
ping it of its natural status sińce govemment ought to be exercised fo r  the benefit o f 
the people; which consists in the enjoyment o f  life and liberty, with the right o f 
acąuiring and using property, and... o f  pursuing... happiness...1. The quarrel be­
tween the Federalists and the Antifederalists reflected a contest about the place of 
natural rights in American constitutionalism. In the eighteenth century the term 
“natural” had three meanings. “Natural” meant rights inherent in the colonists’ 
formal relations with Britain. It also meant a reference to the laws established by 
God as the laws of naturę in the universe8. However, to derive concrete rights from 
God’s creation was not easy. Hence the third use, the rights inherited from the 
original state of naturę. To talk in that context about rights was to reject historical 
experience and go into the state of naturę and ask a ąuestion what rights human 
beings must originally have possessed and could conceivably have agreed to sur- 
render when, out o f nothing but their free consent, they had brought governments 
into being9. Such a doctrine undermined all arguments derived from history like the 
one employed by the English common law jurisprudence or the doctrine that par­
liament has the supreme disposal o f every thing10.
To be sure, an original element of American constitutionalism was the re- 
duction to positive law of the norms of institutional and individual behaviour le­
gitimate in a polity. That included only some principles of natural rights. Yet in the 
eighteenth century, the concept of the “higher law” protecting the totality of natural 
rights not included in the positive text was deeply intemalized11. The Americans 
tried to reclaim their rights on the basis of the British Constitution. There was yet 
in their ąuarrels an assumption that its laws should be observed because they were 
the universal law of liberty, not just positive law. The Declaration of Independence 
of 1776 reflected not a revolutionary rhetoric but the very justification of the 
American polity with which the Constitution of 1787 had to have an intimate rap- 
port.
7 M. F a r ra n d ,  op. cit., vol. 2, p. 137. The last, rejected attempt to include the natural rights in the Bill of 
Rights was made by Roger Sherman, whose proposal was similar to the State versions. Ibidem, p. 267.
8 B. B a ily n , The Ideological Origins o f  the American Revolution, Cambridge 1967, p. 187.
9 D. T. R o d g e rs , Contested Truths, New York 1987, p. 49-51.
10 W. B la c k s to n e ,  Commentaries on the Laws o f  England, Chicago 1979, vol. 1, p. 51.
11 See: Corwin on the Constitution, ed. R. L o ss , vol. 1, Ithaca 1981, pp. 79-140.
During the debate, the Americans were pushed to the “state of naturę” 
rhetoric12. For once they could not find justification for a rebellion in the traditional 
natural law authorities, such as Puffendorf, Burlamaąui, Vattel or Hutcheson. But 
the justification of the revolution was of their own making. The colonists thought 
that their rights as men were best expressed in the British Constitution13. In the 
Declaration, Jefferson rejected the British positive law as in fact betraying the prin- 
ciples upon which it was supposed to be framed, namely the rights of Englishmen, 
as the rights of men. Al though such rights were within a certain paradigm of hu­
man condition they were fundamental and took precedence over positive law14.
The new “inalienable” rights were natural and as such antecedent to law, 
that is history. As Alexander Hamilton stated in 1775 the sacred rights ofmankind  
are not to be rummaged fo r  among old parchments or musty records... they are 
written... in the whole volume o f human naturę15. That meant departing from legał 
rights and supplanting them with inalienable natural rights, in the realm of morał 
philosophy. There was a danger in this break with the tradition of laws and history. 
That is why the authors of the state constitutions tried to contain the rhetoric of 
rights defining and limiting them and cutting off the speculations about the state of 
naturę from the soberer, legał word “right”16. nevertheless, the absolute language 
of natural rights had not been weeded out from the state constitutions.
The same applied to the federal Bill of Rights. Madison tried to insert them 
into Art. I, sec. 9 of the Constitution. That would mean that they would not assume 
an absolute language of the state bills of rights placed at the beginning of the state 
constitutions or in their preambles. The conseąuences of such a structure would 
have been far reaching, especially in conjunction with the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments. As part of the Congressional article the Bill of Rights would have 
amounted not to the absolute truth but could be dependent on the legislative defini- 
tion. Those rights were conceived thus, as representative Egbert Benson remarked 
-  as belonging to the people.. all they meant to provide against was their being 
infringed by the Govemmentxl. That meant that the fear of the Antifederalists con- 
ceming the potential abuse of powers by Congress was feasible.
However, the intended placement of the Bill of Rights in Art. I would have 
had another conseąuence. It would have reąuired the use of legally enforceable 
“shall” and “will”, which Madison intended. That would amount to an abandon-
12 But the rhetoric o f natural rights was being abandoned in the second half o f  the eighteenth century /with 
an exception o f  Rousseau and Paine/. For instance Edmund Burkę derided the idea o f searching for the rights of 
men in all the nakedness and solitude o f  metaphysical abstraction which was utopian. See: The Works o f  tlie Right 
Honorable Edmund Burkę, 51,1 ed., vol. 3, Boston 1877, p. 240.
13 See: D. S. L u tz , The Relative Influence o f  European Writers on Late Eighteenth -  Century American 
Political Thought, “American Political Science Review” 1984, vol. 78, pp. 189-197; see also: A. B ry k , The Urnits 
to Arbitrary G ovem m ent, Kraków 1995, p. 184.
14 See: E. V ie i r a ,  Rights and the United States Constitution, “Georgia Law Review” 1979, vol. 13, 
p. 1448-1457. The issue was whether the Declaration was using the language o f abstract or the communal sense of 
rights. Jefferson seemed to reject the former notion when he stated in 1814 that the authority o f the Declaration 
rested on the harmonizing sentiments o fth e  day, [in:] G. W i lis , lnventing America, New York 1978, p. 172.
15 B. B a ily n ,  op. cit., p. 188.
16 The Works o f  John Adams, ed. Ch. F. A d a m s , Boston 1850-1856, vol. 3, p. 463.
17 D. T. R o d g e rs ,  op. cit., p. 63.
ment of the merely admonitory “ought” and “should” used in the state bills of 
rights placed usually at the beginning of their constitutions. The Madisonian 
change was probably more technical than intellectual. With Jefferson he saw the 
need of the bill to defend individual rights but their possible placing in Art. I. 
showed that he considered them at the same constitutional level as enumerated or 
unenumerated powers, with possible conseąuential changes. When finally the 
House of Representatives accepted a proposal to place the Bill of Rights at the end 
of the Constitution as amendments it was necessary to change the wording to le- 
gally enforceable language sińce “shall” cannot be amended with an "ought"18. 
That change in language resulted in the fact that the Supreme Court could later 
emerge as the definer and protector of legał rights thus paving the way for judicial 
review. Yet the consequences of the Bill of Rights for the development of judicial 
review stemmed, first of all, from the inclusion of the Ninth Amendment.
The Ninth Amendinent, the Natural Rights and Positive Law of the Constitution
The First Congress of 1789 finally accepted the amendments. The Ninth Amend­
ment declared that The enumeration in the Constitution o f certain rights shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people19 The Ninth and 
Tenth Amendments were traditionally interpreted as articles ensuring that the fed­
eral government could not go beyond the first eight enumerated articles of the Bill. 
They were to preclude the interpretation of the Constitution that what was not ex- 
plicitly prohibited in the Bill. The Ninth Amendment was simply to state that the 
declaration of certain limits on federal powers was not to be construed as meaning 
that those are the only limits20.
The “other rights retained by the people” were to be other limits sińce the 
granting of powers to the federal govemment was of a limited naturę. The power 
not granted to it was a right possessed by the people. This kind of reasoning was 
the standard Federalist argument about the naturę of the enumerated powers. It was 
stated in the Tenth Amendment which expressed the principle of the American 
federal system. It declared that the powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respec- 
tively, or to the people. The original Madisonian motion did not contain the phrase 
“or to the people”. It was just a proposal to alleviate the states which were par- 
ticularly awcious that it should be declared in the Constitution, that the power not 
therein delegated should be reserved to the several states2'. Roger Sherman altered 
the last clause, possibly to stress that it was up to the people of each state to decide 
which powers they wanted to give to their state govemments and which they
18 “Annals o f the Congress o f the United States”, Washington 1834, vol. 1, p. 731-732; E. V ie ir a ,  op. 
cit., pp. 105-112, 117-128, 197-198, 287-288.
19 D. S. L u tz , A Preface to American Political Tlieory, Lawrence 1992, p. 77.
20 F. C a n a v a n , Judicial Power and the Ninth Amendment, “The Intercollegiate Review” 1987 (Spring), p. 27.
21 See: “Annals o f Congress...”, vol. 1, p. 441.
should retain. In that sense those powers did not constitute a federal constitutional 
ąuestion22.
The aforementioned interpretation of the Ninth Amendment, was congru- 
ent with its authors’ intentions. But its role in American constitutionalism was to be 
wider. It was also a response to the Antifederalists’ fear of the danger of the gen­
erał constitutional clauses for the power of the federal govemment. The Ninth 
Amendment would then answer the reservations of a graver naturę than those 
raised by Madison and would repudiate the Federalist argument about the precise 
limits of enumerated powers. By the inclusion of the Ninth Amendment, the Feder­
alists implicitly conceded, that there might be certain rights the people could claim 
if the federal government acting in trust usurped power beyond the provisions of 
the Constitution.
Such a usurpation would not mean only the usurpation of the rights which 
the people possessed in the states, that is the encroachment on the state rights. It 
would also mean the usurpation of rights which the people possessed by the very 
fact of being human and which were not guaranteed by the state rights. In such an 
interpretation the meaning of the clause “rights retained by the people” would not 
be limited to the political protection of rights by the states. Hence the Ninth 
Amendment could be treated as a generał clause, irrespective of its authors’ inten­
tions, guarding the totality of rights, even those protected by neither the state con­
stitutions nor the federal Bill of Rights. It would then express the norm that the 
federal and state govemments were just the people’s creation. They would decide 
every time what rights they would consider to be off limits to the state or federal 
govemments. Otherwise, the federal and state governments would have to be 
thought of as a construction freezing the meaning of what is human vis a vis the 
power of the state. That would be a rejection of the fundamental premise of the 
United States that the meaning of “liberty”, “pursuit of happiness” or “welfare” 
expressed in the Declaration of Independence and in the Preamble were given the 
ultimate definition.
These undefined rights “retained by the people” of the Ninth Amendment 
seem to go beyond the rights reserved to the people by the state or federal bills of 
rights. Moreover those rights did not necessarily mean the rights which the people 
in proper time could give only to their state governments on the assumption that the 
power of the federal government was by definition limited. The undefined rights of 
the Ninth Amendment could be the rights which the people might claim against the 
state govemments if these govemments contravened their new understanding of 
rights and the federal govemment if it tried to go beyond the enumerated powers. 
That interpretation would be congruent with the Federalist understanding of the 
Constitution as a compact not between the states but as an arrangement created by 
the people.
Such an interpretation is not contradicted by the fact that Roger Sherman 
added the phrase "or to the people” to the original Madisonian clause that the pow-
~  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 768; F. C a n  a v an , op. cii., p. 27.
ers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively2i. The notłon was accepted with the 
understanding that it was up to the people of each state to decide which powers 
they wanted to give the state govemment and which they wanted to withhold. That 
phrase would not constitute then a federal ąuestion24. The Constitution was a com- 
promise and to assume that its text would be free of imprecise legał provisions was 
not shared even by its authors. The people were in a position in the futurę to confer 
or withhold any right on both the state and the federal govemment. That right 
stemmed ultimately from the right of liberty, the subject I will treat at length later.
The Ninth Amendmenfs “rights retained by the people” were thus not only 
the rights retained by the states or by the people who could specify them through 
the states. They could be natural rights and other unspecified unwritten rights as 
well. Such an interpretation contradicts the Federalist understanding of the Consti­
tution, that there were no individual natural rights in contradistinction to social 
rights claimed under the Constitution. Madison, the main author of the Bill of 
Rights, was yet not elear whether the rights in the Constitution would be only so­
cial or also natural rights.
In the Congress of 1789 he stated, as later Jefferson would, that some 
amendment rights asserted, not created, were based on practice and the naturę of 
the political compact, but he added that some were based on the laws of naturę. 
Among these the right of liberty was here a boundless right which might be made 
specific. But the trial by jury or the other specific rights in the Constitution did not 
amount to the total meaning of the right of liberty which was culture bound25.
Cotnmon Law and Puritanism as sources of the American constitutionalism
The aforementioned statement could mean that the United States was not based 
solely on the positive law of the Constitution. In the American context that possi- 
bility was supported by a tradition of common law and Puritanism. The law for the 
common law tradition was much more than just the measure of reason, it was the 
measure and source ofvirtue as well26. Puritanism, on the other hand, had a ten- 
dency to “make a morał ąuestion of everything, and yet in such a way as to make it 
a legał ąuestion"27.
Those two traditions created a legał culture where the common law courts 
were in a peculiar position towards the law. The justification and interpretation of 
it, rooted in precedent, not a code of civil law tradition that demanded simply ad- 
ministration of law, were its modus operandi. The adjudicating in individual cases,
23 “Annals o f Congress...", vol. 1, p. 436, 768.
24 F. C a n a v a n , op. cit., p. 27.
25 “Annals o f Congress....” , p. 437.
26 D. L it t le ,  Religion, Order and Law, New York 1969, p. 177.
27 A. P e k e l is ,  Law and Social Action, Ithaca 1950, p. 4.
infused with the puritan culture gave the courts a quasi “religious” character28. 
Some think that the Constitution of 1787 had that dual quality of written and un- 
written law sińce its generał and morally biased clauses as well as the most impor­
tant provisions of the American fundamental statutes contain no more than an ap- 
peal to the decency and wisdom o f those with whom the responsibility fo r  their 
enforcement rests29.
The common law mode of reasoning never relinąuished its claim to an 
autonomous inąuiry into justice based on reason. Such a pre-liberal and pre- 
enlightenment tradition, perfected by Edward Coke in the seventeenth century, was 
rooted in the capacity of the common law judiciary to meet human problems on the 
case to case basis in reference to past situations and decisions. Thus it was implicit 
in the common law tradition that any positive enactments issued by command 
could never be automatically accepted as law. The common law judiciary’s rational 
inąuiry into justice on the day to day adjudication enabled them to claim for them- 
selves a norm to disregard the command of positive enactments. In the seventeenth 
century England as well as in the colonies this already meant a right to ąuestion the 
parliamentary statute or the king’s prerogative as contrary to reason and justice30.
Such an approach was based on a conviction that the will of the sovereign 
would not be able to structure the multitude of human experience into elear cut 
rules applicable to any situation. Hence, the common law courts were, from their 
beginning, inclined to give ‘reasons’ for their decisions whether they interpreted 
the law or made it. The finding of reasons went beyond just the mere statutory con- 
struction. It was an exposition of a particular morality. It was a kind of a communal 
preaching derived from an individual case. The courts were taking on a role of 
forming a standard of behaviour and elevating their role to an unprecedented 
height. The legał culture of the Anglo-Saxon world despite the individualistic tech- 
niąue of the common-law courts where the case and precedent were the rules, be­
cause o f the strength o f  the enforcement devices, the clerical and moralistic char­
acter o f  the legał approach at large, the duty o f disclosure, the close control 
exercised by the community upon the individual and upon the law, i f  compared 
with the analogous institutions o f the Latin countries,... disclose... a more collec- 
tivistic than... individualistic character o fthe common-law system... what is gener- 
ally considered as and takenfor the individualistic aspect o f  American life is sim- 
ply the existence and coexistence o f a plurality o f communities and... o f an 
extremely great number o f  communities ofvarious types31.
Thus apart from dispensing law, the American legał institutions had from 
the beginning the role of creating a commonly acceptable meaning of conduct. 
That gave the courts both legał and morał or even ąuasi religious character. The 
moralistic approach, the Enlightenment and the code of natural rights, the rigid 
Constitution as fundamental law and finally the majoritarian politics effectively
28 The idea was implicit in “Dr. BonhairTs Case” o f 1610, “Rowles vs. M ason” o f 1612 and “Writs of As­
sistance Case” in 1761. See: A. B ry k , op. cit., pp. 169-189.
29 H. J. P o  w e 11, The Morał Tradition o f  American Constitutitmalism, Durham 1993, pp. 66-67, also 81-82.
30 The same applied to the common law tradition in England. See: A. B ry k , op. cit., p. 113-114.
31 See: C. A lb a n e s e ,  Sons o fth e  Fathers, Philadelphia 1976, p. 194.
blocked, made the judiciary not only an interpreter of constitutional law. Those 
elements elevated the American judiciary, especially the Supreme Court to an un- 
precedented position of power32.
It was the judiciary not Congress which was looked upon as an institution 
to express the morał community standards, where the administrative system of the 
state in the European sense did not exist and the common culture were weaker. At 
the beginning, the Congress tried to play such a role, making reference to things 
fundamental but later it abandoned that role33. The ethical and religious diversity of 
the expanding republic soon made the homogeneity of the American society a thing 
of the past. The judiciary began to assume a role of a lawyer, preacher, official and 
judge. The culture ceased to be a unifying element; such a role was expected of and 
imposed on the judges. They, not the churches, began to express and to define the 
standards for the community as such.
After the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 the federal judges’ 
role was enhanced as “republican schoolmasters”, the builders of the “civil relig­
ion”, of which the faith in the Constitution was an indispensable element34. Federal 
judges rode with the gospel o fthe civil religion and preached sermons in which the 
Constitution, its virtue and its promise, figured prominentlyi5. The Antifederalists 
were right, if for different reasons, when they were afraid of the extension of the 
republic and the destruction of the “civil religion” of the smali communities. For 
the big republic to be more homogeneous, forces imposing cultural homogeneity 
were needed. When Brutus wrote about judicial review he had such an imposition 
of the civil religion by means of the federal government in mind. Puritanism and 
the common law also caused the courts to rise to unprecedented prominence in 
American society36.
Natural Rights as a source of American “civil religion”
At the end of the eighteenth century there were only two shared fundamental pre- 
suppositions of the American society. One was the war with Britain, the other the 
doctrine of “natural rights”. These rights were a cultural reality, the only legacy of 
the new nation. For the founders, the popular government had to be reconciled with 
higher standards o f  political morality 7. The assumption that the positive law of the 
Constitution had to conform to that doctrine of natural rights was taken for granted. 
That assumption was yet difficult to conceptualise. The Americans were aware that 
they did not discover all natural rights. Moreover, they were not certain how to
32 See: J. J. R o u s s e a u , The Social Contract, Chicago 1954, book 4, chapter 8, pp. 204-223; R. L e rn e r , 
The Thinking Revolutionary, Ithaca 1987.
33 See: C. A lb a n e s e ,  op. cit., p. 218.
34 See H. J. S to r in g ,  Wliat the Anti-Federalists Were For, Chicago 1981, pp. 15-24.
35 S. B a rb e r , The Federalist and the Anomalies o f  New Right Constitutionalism, “New Kentucky Law 
Review” 1988, vol. 15, p. 437, 439.
36 The Bill o f  Rights, ed. J. K u k la , Richmond 1987, pp. 143-144.
37 W. B la c k s to n e ,  op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 39-40.
secure those put forth in, for instance, the Declaration of Independence38. In the 
Declaration and the Preamble the very concept of liberty, as a natural right, sug- 
gested the indeterminacy of natural rights.
The inability to discover natural rights all at once, meant that they were 
open to reason, flexible and culture bound, thus subject to endless determinations. 
That was the staple of the eighteenth century legał thinking best expressed by 
Blackstone and his idea of indeterminacy of natural rights due to the failure of hu­
man reason. Experience decided the content of natural law more than reason39.
The Americans knew that natural rights were immutable but the operative 
factors might change due to better understanding of human societies and human 
naturę. As the Chief Justice of the Virginia Highest Court Edmund Pendleton re- 
marked in 1788: May we not in the progress o f things, discover some great and 
important [right] which we do not now think of?40. One commentator stated that as 
civilization progressed we increase in spiritual and intelłectual growth and are 
capable o f  understanding natural rights and liberties that have always existed, but 
which have been beyond our limited intellect to comprehenct1. The application of 
the natural rights doctrine could also change thus. The Constitution contained 
phrases which were definitely open-ended. It was obvious that the language of 
those open-ended provisions was not definite, imposing on the interpreter the duty 
to identify the sorts o f  evils against which the provision was directed and to move 
against their contemporary counterparts42. That did not defy the original intentions 
of the framers, it would leave to the interpreter a determination of the present scope 
and meaning o f a decision that the nation, at an earlier time, articulated and en- 
acted into the constitutional te x fi .
In that context the Ninth Amendment as a statement of the repository of the 
rights retained by the people was a certain safety valve, a comment on the cultural 
paradigm of the Americans. It was also a statement that the positive law was sub- 
servient to a larger one giving anyone whom the people trusted -  including the 
courts -  the right to wrench from the political system those would be rights. But the 
amendment constituted a defeat of Madison and of the more conservative framers. 
If they tried to strip the Constitution and the Bill of Rights of speculation regarding 
the origins of rights, and conseąuently the ultimate legitimacy of government, in 
other words if they wanted to drop any pretences comparable to the grandiose 
statements of the first Virginia Declaration of Rights or the French Revolution’s 
“Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen”, they failed. The state recom- 
mendations for the bills of rights were, for instance, fuli of natural rights philoso- 
phy. The natural rights rhetoric of the Antifederalists had won.
Madison and the conservatives did not fail completely. The vocabulary of 
the first eight amendments did not contain even a hint that those rights were inal-
38 Letters and Papers o f  Edmund Pendleton, ed. D. M a y es , Cambridge, vol. 2, p. 533.
39 B. P a t te r s o n ,  The Forgotten Ninth Amendment, Indianapolis 1955, p. 54.
40 J. H. E ly , Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge 1980, p. 13.
41 H. L in d e , Judges, Critics and the Realist Tradition, “Yale Law Review” 1972, vol. 82, p. 227.
42 See: J. M. S m ith , Freedom Fetters, New York 1956, pp. 305,433.
43 The Bill o f  Rights, ed. B. S c h w a r tz ,  New York 1971, vol. 2, pp. 840, 911, 966.
ienable. They were legał, positivist commands without any -  at least it seemed so 
in 1789 -  generalities open to speculation. The talk was about power and its con- 
tainment. The language of “inalienable rights” was abandoned even by Thomas 
Jefferson who, battling the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 did not use the lan­
guage of rights of man but of the Constitution44.
That did not mean that the natural rights rhetoric was just a useful tool to 
sever ties with Britain but could not form the basis of the positivist rules of deci­
sion. Even Madison preparing amendments made such remarks45. James Wilson, 
voiced the same opinion. He referred to the Declaration of Independence that this is 
the broad basis on which our independence was placed; on the same certain and 
solid foundation [the Constitution] is erectect6. The natural rights rhetoric of the 
Declaration was indeed in vogue then. The “pursuit of happiness” doctrine was the 
underlying value of the contemporary positivist legał thinking of Locke or Black- 
stone47. Early Supreme Court opinions were also grounded in the natural rights 
rhetoric which testified to the fact that natural rights could be a legitimate source of 
decision48.
The Ninth Amendment and the Judieiary
In this context the Ninth Amendment had a potential to be treated as a provision 
the legał naturę of which was not excluded. Implicit in it was the notion o f a re- 
serve o f extra legał rights [which] had been a tool... a crowbar to throw in the 
tracks o f[a  political system]49. The Ninth Amendment’s natural rights could not be 
directly translated into the judicially enforced rights. They [did] not lend them- 
selves to principled judicial enforcement and should therefore be treated as i f  they 
were directed exclusively to the political branches. The same argument could be 
applied to the positive rights which could also be abused by the judieiary.
One has to mention here the fundamental premises of the American liberał 
culture which make the confinement of the idea of liberty to the strict language of 
the positive law, including the Constitution difficult. The “rights” talk of the 
American Revolution, the implicit civil disobedience, the extra-legal political cul-
44 In: The Documentary History..., vol. 2. p. 473.
45 The “pursuit o f happiness” used by John Locke in reference to ethical system subsumed the rights of 
liberty and property, which were related. But it was a wider concept. M. C r a n s to n ,  John Locke, London 1957, 
p. 123; J. L o c k e , Essays Concerning Huntan Understanding, Clarendon Press 1894, vol. 1, pp. 342, 345, 348, 
352. There was nothing new about “pursuit o f happiness” . Tory Samuel Johnson as well as Blackstone used it. 
See”: H. I. G a n te r ,  Jefferson’s Pursuit o f  Happiness and Some Forgotten Men, “W illiam and Mary Quarterly” 
1936, 2"d ser., vol. 16, p. 558-585.
46 Van Home’s Lessee vs. Dorrance, 2 Dallas 304. 1975; Calder vs. Buli, 3 Dallas 386,1798; Fletcher vs. Peck,
6 Cranch 87,1810, Terrett vs. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43, 1815. Jefferson himself never denounced the natural rights philosophy 
of the Declaration.
47 D. T. R o d g e rs ,  op. cit., p. 66.
48 J. H. E ly , Democracy..., p. 39.
m Jeremy Bentham considered the American and French Declarations to be incomprehensible. For him 
the rights talk was vague and useless legally. But the critics missed the point in the context o f the American politi­
cal culture. See: The Collected Works o f  Jeremy Bentham, ed. J. B o w r in g , New York 1962, vol. 1, pp. 221-295.
ture has not been confined to the letter of law. For the Americans liberty meant 
a rhetoric of defiance against any authority and the “anarchie” spirit in every 
American always demanded compelling reasons for any govemmental activity. 
Such an attitude had conseąuences for the constitutional law. Because it could be 
used against the more powerful legislative and executive branches, and because it 
had a sense of the mission to impose morał order, rooted in common law reasoning 
and puritan culture, assumed in American history an unprecedented role in Ameri­
can history.
Thus, the natural rights talk had thus subversive possibilities50. The Ameri­
can “rights talk” was not just an enunciation of a political creed but an expression 
of the society nurtured in the environment of boundless possibilities, frontier inde­
pendence, individualism and self-govemment where such a philosophy was practi- 
cally tested. It was not a blueprint for the futurę, it was a defensive polemic to se- 
cure rights of men ready to fight for their possessions with anything, including the 
words dusted off from the European tradition. Such thinking was part of the Ninth 
Amendment.
The rights rhetoric in America was a rejection of an argument that any le­
gał instrument could be definitive, an affirmation of the veto power of the people 
and of each individual. The legitimacy of a political order could be created only by 
an individual acting in concert with others, or as it became later customary, an in- 
dividual having a right to exercise its veto power. In the United States that individ- 
ual could exercise his power in defence of his rights through political branches and 
that was the rationale for the modem democratic theory. But the individual could 
defend his rights in a more direct way through the machinery of the federal courts, 
acting on his behalf against the state. The Antifederalists were afraid that the fed­
eral judiciary would ally itself with the other branches of the federal govemment. 
Yet this never happened. It began, in time, to challenge the federal power in the 
name of natural rights of whose repository was the Ninth Amendment.
Judicial review in the name of natural rights of the Ninth Amendment was 
thus a possibility written into the Constitution, but was rooted in the American 
political culture. The strife for the Ninth Amendment in the Constitution, that is 
positive law document, was a strife for the safety valve of the unbound natural 
rights of the individual grounded ultimately in the very justification of the Ameri­
can polity, that is the Declaration of Independence and its most explosive rhetoric 
of liberty and the pursuit of happiness as well as the potentially explosive rhetoric 
of the Preamble. It was a hidden expression of that old English concept of liberties 
visible in Coke’s theory of the Ancient Constitution long abandoned in Britain, 
which stated that the Constitution was never a grant of inherent rights and liberties 
to the individual. It was only a collection of powers which were granted to the gov- 
emment. The theory of individual rights was much more than a part o f the Ameri­
can unwritten Constitution, in the same manner in which portions o f  the unwritten 
English Constitution are recognized and enforced.... it [was and] is much more
30 B. P a t t e r s o n ,  op. cit., p. 20.
than the unwritten Constitution; the individual inherent rights and liberties ante- 
date and are above the constitutions and may be called pre-constitutional rights.
The Ninth Amendment constituted thus an act of inclusion into the Con­
stitution of the ultimate philosophy of government expressed by John Adams in 
1765 I say RIGHTS... antecedent to all earthy government, Rights, that cannot be 
repealed or restrained by human laws -  Rights derived from  the great legislator o f 
the Universe. That meant the assertion of the inherent right of revolution being part 
of the Constitution. Such a theory of rights was a burden on the constitutional sys­
tem which required an institutional containment of that inherent veto power of 
individuals against the govemment.
For Americans that logie of rights had an indefinite indeterminacy. If they 
discovered rights once and then from time to time reformulated them and put them 
into enumerations having legał character that would have blunted the revolutionary 
potential of the concept of right. The Federalists in generał wanted that. Yet the 
connection of “right” and “naturę” developed in America into a more extreme form 
in the political arena. The language of rights expressed not only the rights which 
humans possessed and which could arguably be enumerated by deliberations about 
history, existing laws or comparative legał enąuiries. The language of rights in the 
Constitution framed the discussion in terms of what rights humans, given their 
naturę, ought to possess. It meant that the rights the Americans ought to possess 
were going to be taken from the futurę, if the concept of humanity would follow 
the precepts of progress in human character or society.
Such an understanding of rights opened imagination about the hypothetical 
state of naturę, where the humans had uncontaminated, fuli rights. It was exactly 
that frame of mind, that beginning ab ovo of human creation, this open enticement 
to leapfrog across custom, institutions, and history into a nick o f  time, a state o f  
naturę antecedent to all human governments, and to repossess whatever claims had 
been left behind -  it was this that made the words so volatile, the rights themselves 
so expandable5' . The rigidity of the Constitution in the federal system caused that 
the natural rights ingredient of the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution had 
a potential of growth well beyond the intentions of those who created it. It could 
also define the tenor of American society and constitutional law in time more than 
anything else. It also created an opening for judicial review in the form of judi- 
cially enforceable rights demanded by the individuals which the blocked ordinary 
politics of the federal system could not deliver.
In that sense judicial review could be understood as a correction of 
a blocked or perverted political system of both state and federal govemment, as 
a means of creating legitimacy and preventing revolution in the name of perverted 
or blocked rights. Judicial review was just one of the possible institutions more 
adeąuate to the expression of the finał justification of the peoples’ will in the Con­
stitution. That justification rested ultimately on the premise that all political power 
had to give compelling reasons, or justify themselves to citizens understood as
51 J. A d a m s , op. cit., pp. 4-5.
bearers of equal natural rights. Of those rights the right of liberty equal to all of the 
Declaration of Independence and Preamble, were the most fundamental sińce they 
constituted the very reason for which the American government was created52. Law 
created by democratic institutions such as Congress could not thus be deemed justi- 
fiable ipso facto. Democratic politics was not in the American blocked system the 
only and the best way of ensuring the right of individual to defend his human 
rights. There was thus in the Constitution, as a fundamental law, a need for an in­
stitution going beyond democratic theory. Judicial review next to legislative 
authority of Congress was an outcome of that53.
The explosion of the “rights” talk in America at the end of the twentieth 
century had nothing to do with the Antifederalists’ idea of the civilized society of 
individuals, having not only rights but also duties. Yet such were the conseąuences 
of the political culture they lived in. The contradiction in the Antifederalists 
thought was thus a contradiction which lay at the root of American constitutional- 
ism and is thus a contradiction of modem, liberał thought, or simply put of modemity.
The natural rights theories of the eighteenth century could not completely 
codify all the rights pertaining to the humanity and had to leave that indeterminacy 
as a background to the positive law. Such an unwritten law existed and the ultimate 
political expression of it was the “right of revolution"54. In the state constitutions 
those certain binding principles of higher law were unwritten, left out of the text 
but still binding55. The Ninth Amendment was the textual expression of this idea in 
the Constitution of 178756.
52 The right o f revolution was a sacred right of a British subject. Under the US Constitution it was tacitly ac- 
knowledged although the conditions for such a right were not elear. See: The Founder’s Constitution, P. B. K u r la n d , 
R. L e rn e r ,  Chicago 1987, vol. 1, pp. 76-95; J. A d a m s , op. cit., pp. 19-20; D. T. R o d g e rs ,  op. cit., p. 46. Even 
Blackstone, a believer in the sovereignty o f parliament stated that the actions destructive to “the spirit o f liberty” 
were contrary to natural law and the English Constitution. But he begged the question how the sovereign parlia­
ment could be prevented from doing this. See: Commentaries..., p. 125.
53 The Ninth Amendment was dormant for most o f its history. It got into the fore in the 1960’s. when the 
process o f incorporation o f the Bill o f  Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment began. The Supreme Court was here 
divided over the meaning of the new unenumerated rights read into the Constitution. In terms of positive constitu­
tional law, the amendment that spoke o f unenumerated rights seemed to be o f little use. But it reasserted itself with 
fuli force in a case “Griswold vs. Connecticut” in 1965 where the Court created a right o f privacy found in penum- 
bras, form ed  by emanations from guarantees o f the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Three justices in 
an opinion by justice Goldberg used the Ninth Amendment as an additional basis for striking down the Connecti­
cut law. They referred to “traditions”, “conscience o f our people” to determine whether a right was to be regarded 
as fundamental. It was the reading into the Constitution o f a substantive due process clause compromised already 
at the beginning of the twentieth century by the conservative court which read into the Constitution the “freedom 
of contract” clause. Justice Hugo L. Black dissented. For Black “natural law due process formuła” permitted the 
judges, unacceptably “to roam at large in the broad expanses o f policy and morals” , violating the authority of 
legislature. The Ninth Amendment was then used in Eisenstadt vs. Baird in 1972 and Roe vs. Wade in 1973. In 
generał the Ninth Amendment was invoked in over 1200 cases in the states and at the federal level. See: 
R. B e rg e r , The Ninth Amendment, “Comell Law Review” 1980, vol. 61, p. 1, note 2.
54 That tum ed later to the “right o f civil disobedience” . See: Making America, ed. L. S. L u e d tk e , Chapel 
Hill & London 1992, pp. 453-464.
55 T. C. G re y , Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, “Stanford Law Review” 1975, vol. 27, pp. 715- 
716; also his: Origins o fth e  Unwritten Constitution, “Stanford Law Review” 1978, vol. 30, p. 843.
56 As Roscoe Pound remarked nothing in the Constitution should be taken to be idle and of no moment, in 
B. P a t t e r s o n ,  op. cit., p. III.
That opened up the ąuestion who was in a position to speeify the content of 
those non positive natural rights57. It could be “the people” through the legislature 
or “the justices”. That was not very elear during the founding period. Of course, the 
Constitution, the state constitutions with all the rights enumerated, powers granted 
did not exclude the possibility of additional rights. Both the federal and the state 
fundamental laws defined the operational boundaries of power. The origin of the 
Bill of Rights was to remove the fears... o f many... people o fth e  Commonwealth, 
and... more effectively guard against an undue administration o f  the federal gov- 
ernment. The operational phrase here is “more effectually” or as Madison wrote the 
rights in the Bill of Rights were included as exemplary “limitations of... powers, or 
as inserted merely for greater caution”58. The Bill of Rights supported by the Fed­
eralists was conceived as a list not creating any rights.
Since the Federalists rejected natural rights as part of the federal Bill of 
Rights the possible justification of it would be to treat it as a traditional charter of 
British liberties, as a contract between the people and the federal govemment, as 
a double guarantee to the shaky doctrine of the enumerated powers. The Federalists 
were able to draw a conclusion from the Antifederalists’ attack and stated that the 
pure enumeration could mean that what was not prohibited in the Bill of Rights 
was given to the federal government. In such a case the Ninth Amendment rejected 
such a reasoning. Its “rights retained by the people” meant in such a case that the 
federal govemment was not of “generał” powers, along the lines of the state gov- 
emments. That was the justification given to it by Edmund Randolph for whom the 
Ninth Amendment’s purpose was a reservation against constructive power59. The 
limits of the Ninth Amendment’s rights were set by the Tenth Amendment repeat- 
ing the Federalists’ argument that: powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the People.
Whatever the Federalists thought, the Ninth Amendment constituted a re- 
jection of their argument of the Constitution of the “enumerated” powers. It was 
a błock to the “implied powers” doctrine. People now had all the powers not dele­
gated by Constitution. One could argue that the Ninth Amendment was a repetition 
of the founding doctrine of the United States that the supreme, absolute, and un- 
controllable authority remains with the people60. But the Ninth Amendment went 
further. It did not only contain that basie, aforementioned doctrine. It opened the 
road to means of controlling the usurpation of power by the peoples institutions, 
such as Congress or President, by another institution which had legitimacy by the 
logie of rights which could be legally enforceable. The notion of "rights” is crucial 
here, and the Ninth Amendment’s inclusion in the Bill of Rights underscores it. As 
part of the Constitution which might be enforceable on the basis of rights the Ninth 
Amendment underscores the fact that the structure of the Constitution and its in-
57 L. L ev y , Original lntent and the Framers Constitution, New York 1988, p. 278; The Rights Re­
tained..., pp. 291-336.
58 “Annals o f Congress 1789’’...
59 Papers o f  James Madison..., vol. 12, p. 459.
60 The Documentary History..., p. 472.
stitutions is accountable to the inalienable rights as the basis of legitimacy of any 
power.
As such the legitimate political power was essentially a form of judicial 
power a judgment about our equal inalienable rights, and the reasonable use o f 
power to advance human interests eąually. The Bill of Rights underlined the fact 
that the relations of citizens with the govemment were justified only if their rights 
were protected. Besides, these rights could not be abstract; they had to be judicially 
protected. In that sense the inclusion of the state and federal Bill of Rights corre- 
sponded with the tradition of protecting rights through the common law courts. 
Traditionally, the common law judiciary was focused on forms of proceedings, 
concrete grievances of individuals and the discovery o f  law through consideration 
o f 'the naturę and the reason ofthe thing ’61.
Under the United States Constitution the “naturę and reason of the thing” 
were individual rights grounded in the fundamental right of liberty grounded in 
justice. That did not mean that the judiciary could not usurp that power. It only 
meant that there had to be an institution within the structure of the govemment 
which could guard rights in individual cases. The judiciary would be the guardian 
not the sovereign which by protecting rights would underscore the basie under­
standing of the Constitution as a motley of rules of constitutional law, that is as an 
institutional structure accountable to some form of control of essentially judicial 
naturę. That stemmed from the liberał theory of the Constitution as a framework 
within which the individual rights had to be realized. In that context the Ninth 
Amendment was extremely important. It conceived of the Constitution not as 
a closed system of government, but as the best institutional approximation which 
the human mind in 1787 could devise to protect the development of individuals as 
autonomous human beings.
As has already been mentioned the last statement needs clarification. If the 
United States Constitution was a flexible instrument, prone to frequent change, 
then the will of the people could be thought to be realized by its representative 
institutions. The faculty of judgement so specific to the judiciary could be also 
located in the legislators or the people themselves62. But the Constitution was 
a rigid document with the will of the people of 1787 frozen in time. The amend- 
ments are extremely difficult to introduce and thus freąuent references to the peo­
ple are not a feasible mechanism of assessment as to what their will would be. The 
altemative, that is the so-called “departmental review", which would give each 
department of govemment the right to be a constitutional judge of its own powers, 
thus the Constitution as a whole, would be contrary to the notion of nemo iudex in 
propria causa law and would lead to incessant disputes and the finał appeal to the 
people.
In Federalist 49 Madison discussed such an appeal proposed by Jefferson 
in his draft of the Yirginia constitution and rejected it6 , for lack of prudent judg-
61 J. R. S to n e r ,  Sovereign Judging, unpublished PhD dissertation, Harvard 1987, p. 371.
62 The Federalists Papers..., pp. 332, 522.
63 Federalist 49, ibidem, p. 313.
ment. During departmental disputes the dominant faetion in Congress would con­
trol them and a convention and impose its interpretation of the Constitution, on the 
govemment as a whole. The executive could challenge such a convention but still 
the whole discussion could never be expected to turn on the true merits o f the 
ąuestion. It would inevitably be connected with the spirit o f  pre-existing parties, or 
ofparties springing out o fthe ąuestion itself It would be connected with persons o f  
distinguished character and extensive influence in the community. It would be pro- 
nounced by the very men who had been agents in, or opponents o f  the measures to 
which the decision would relate. The passions, therefore, not the reason, would sit 
in judgment. But it is the reason, alone, o f the public, that ought to control and 
regulate the government. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the 
govemment6 .
In the light of the aforementioned comments the consequences of the Ninth 
Amendment were thus far reaching. One was the rejection of the “enumerated 
powers” doctrine and the concession that Congress had to be observed sińce its 
powers could be usurped. If Congress yet was in a position of expanding its power, 
then as Coke stated in Dr. Bonham’s Case of 1610 prohibiting iudex in propria 
causa, there had to be an outside locus of judgment of legislation. The executive 
would not be a proper locus of judgment in such a case also because Congress was 
at the beginning the most potent institution. The Ninth Amendment could thus be 
used as a challenge to congressional legislation and a need for an arbiter was 
a logical necessity 5.
Madison’s judgment was unequivocal, a certain afterthought on his earlier 
efforts to introduce a Council of Revision. Any legislative usurpation which might 
threaten the liberties of the people should be protected and the federal judieiary 
was the only institution which could do it. For the Antifederalists such a possibility 
was not likely, sińce they, like Brutus, were sure the judieiary would be in alliance 
with the legislature. But the judieiary could be looked upon as a protector of rights 
both enumerated and not enumerated in the written text66. Ultimately the locus of 
judgment was the “people”. But “people” were an abstraction and their right of 
revolution would be a disaster. There was thus a possibility that that locus of judg­
ment would lie in the judieiary, provided that the Antifederalists were wrong and 
the judieiary would retain its independence from the legislative branch.
In such a situation a judicial review imposing a unifying meaning on the 
Constitution had to be given to a nominally non-political body, that is the federal 
judieiary. Only the judieiary was able in case of an individual matter to ascertain 
whether the actions of the elective branches were in pursuance of the Constitution, 
within which the individual rights were guaranteed. But such rights could never be 
wholly codified. That is why there was the Ninth Amendment as a generał clause 
specifying that the totality of rights were retained by the people. The way of 
checking whether the rights needed protection against the federal govemment
64 Ibidem, p. 317.
65 Federalist 10, ibidem.
66 See: R. B e rg e r , Selected Writings on the Constitution, Yirginia 1987, p. 193.
could be done by an individual act of adjudication. The judiciary, acting according 
to the common law mode of reasoning would assess whether there was any harm 
done to an individual.
There was an additional problem of the Ninth Amendment, namely, the 
very naturę of rights retained by the people. The ąuestion thus was not only who 
should guard the rights retained by the people but what were they and who would 
express them. Assuming that the Ninth Amendment established constitutional 
rights, did not yet mean that those rights were operational in the judicial sense that 
they could lend themselves to pńncipled judicial enforcemenł'1. The natural rights 
of the Ninth Amendment could eąually be the province of the political branches 
decided in the process of ordinary political discussion and then taken for granted 
by the judiciary. There were at the beginning of the republic some attempts to 
make the natural law judicially enforceable68 but they were unsuccessful. Yet that 
problem has stood at the centre of American constitutionalism from the very be­
ginning, and it raises some additional ąuestions.
What is the Constitution and who is the interpreter?
If the Constitution had a written and unwritten dimension which was implicit in the 
Ninth Amendment, that meant that both dimensions were part of the fundamental 
law. That did not imply that both dimensions were part of the constitutional law but 
did not exclude such a possibility. There was also a ąuestion what was the relation 
between the written and unwritten dimension of the Constitution, whether the un­
written sphere was part of the document or whether the unwritten dimension was 
by definition outside the constitutional law.
If the unwritten dimension was outside the constitutional law then the judi­
ciary, the institution endowed with the interpretation of the Constitution and the 
rights inherent in it, would go beyond its authority if it appealed to “higher law” 
invoked from behind the Constitution. The natural rights dimensions could of 
course be invoked to clarify the meaning of the positive text. The written words did 
not preclude a natural rights content but judges should not feel free to invoke ideas 
o f natural justice that are not grounded in constitutional text. If the Constitution was 
a set of rules and procedures it was so partly because it flows out o f a coherent and 
knowable, not arbitrary or ever-mutable, set o f philosophic presuppositions69.
If, on the other hand, the Constitution had that unwritten sphere legitimate then 
whoever interpreted the Constitution might legitimately enforce the unwritten norms as 
constitutional. It would follow that those unwritten norms had to be first constitution- 
ally established before being judicially enforceable70. In such a case the Constitution 
would rest on the set of unwritten morals as well as political principles which it ex-
67 J. H. E ly , op. cit, p. 39.
68 Van H om e’s Lessee vs. Dorrance, Calder v Buli; Fletcher vs. Peck; Terrett vs. Taylor.
69 G. J a c o b s e n ,  The Supreme Court and the Decline o f  Constitutional Aspiration, Totowa 1986, p. 75.
70 J. H. E ly , op. cit., p. 39.
pressed and within whose meanings it made sense. It would be then a written document 
which would represent a particular type of an incomplete embodiment of a higher law 
which was sine ąua non a condition of the understanding of the Constitution. Without 
that higher law, the true dimension of the text would be not comprehensible.
With that unwritten dimension of the Constitution the ąuestion would not 
then be whether the Constitution was the normative standard in the American pol­
ity but “what was the Constitution”; the issues of the constitutional interpretation 
and what arbitrary will following. This brings us to the Ninth Amendment. The 
indeterminacy of the Ninth Amendment precludes any appeal to the original intent 
as understood in 1787. What is more, if the generał clauses expressed in the Decla­
ration of Independence or Preamble do not belong to the text of the Constitution, 
then its interpretation could be given to the people. The people would be the sole 
agents to define the boundaries of power and their rights. The public deliberation 
would be the standard of constitutional interpretation and would entail a possibility 
of political argumentation71. The Ninth Amendment would exclude reference to the 
framers’ intent. Public deliberation in history would take precedence. The inter­
pretation of the Constitution through such a process would then be a political prac­
tice about the balance of power vs. liberty, individualism vs. community, of the 
potentialities of human experimentation.
It would not mean that the Constitution was not a standard outside of po-
• 72litical process . It was. But it was especially so in America because of the rights 
culture and the blockade of the “checks and balances”. The Constitutional text 
would thus draw into it all political forces trying to win them over to their side. The 
constitutional political judgment is “true” when it is public not public when it ac- 
cords to some standard external to politics13. Such an interpretation would not 
necessarily exclude the judieiary from the debate. As an institution rooted in the 
tradition of the discovery o f law through consideration o f “the naturę and the rea­
son o f  the thing" it might be well positioned to do that.
Later in life, Madison stated that the express provisions of the Bill of 
Rights in the Constitution would cause that “independent tribunals o f justice will 
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians o f  those rights. Those 
tribunals would form a bulwark against every assumption o f  power in the legisla- 
tive or executive; they will naturally be led to resist every encroachment upon 
rights expressly stipulated fo r  in the constitution by the declaration o f rights14. The 
ąuestion was whether there was a legitimate reason that independent tribunals 
should play such a role as far as the other unenumerated rights retained by the peo­
ple in the Ninth Amendment, that is whether the unenumerated rights could be 
judicially enforceable as the enumerated rights or must they first be established as
71 See R. N. D w o rk in , Law's Empire, Cambridge 1986, p. 7, 47, also: A. M a c ln ty r e ,  After Virtue, 
NotreDame 1981, p. 175.
72 J. A p p le b y , LiberalismandRepubliranism in the HistoricalImagination, Cambridge 1992, pp. 219-221.
71 S. W o 1 i n, Politics and Vision, Boston 1960, p. 64.
74 Annals o f  Congress 1836, ed. G a le s  and S e a to n , vol. l ,p .4 4 0 .
constitutional laws by the political branches before the judiciary could enforce 
them75.
The possibility that the federal judiciary would judicially enforce those un­
enumerated rights before they would be defined by the political branches was thus 
an open option. Judging from the theory of the Constitution and its interpretation 
through the statutory construction that was a possibility. That would also mean that 
the federal judiciary would be independent.
The Content of the Unenumerated Rights
The paramount ąuestion in that context was what could be the content of these 
unenumerated rights. The Madisonian proposal excluded natural rights from the 
federal Bill of Rights and only the inclusion of civil rights or social rights derived 
from social compact was contemplated. But it was logical that the Ninth Amend­
ment had to include “natural rights", along the lines proposed by Sherman76. The 
individual had rights before and without the Constitution and only some of them, 
were mentioned in the Constitution77. Madisonian objection against inclusion of the 
natural rights was based on the validity of the enumerated powers argument.
The Ninth Amendment in fact rejected Madisonian limitation of the Bills 
of Rights. If it was put in the Constitution as a reservation against constructive 
power of the federal govemment, if the Federalist theory of legally precise enu­
merated powers was given up, then the relation between the federal government 
and the people was of the same order as between the state govemments and the 
people.. It was simply a traditional, the English Whig, compact between the rulers 
and the ruled. The fact that the rulers were now the officers of the sovereign people 
did not change the eąuation of power, sińce they too had a potential to usurp its 
power through the construction of the Constitution. In such a case the role of the 
federal Bill of Rights and the State bills of rights would be the same, the prevention 
of the encroachment of political power on the social rights. But that also meant the 
possibility of similar encroachments against the natural rights, and not only the 
social rights. The natural rights guaranteed in the State bills of rights were suffi- 
ciently guarded in the overall federal system, as long as the penetration of the fed-
75 J. H. E ly , op. cit., p. 39.
76 After all, the finał list o f  the Bill o f Rights did not contain all the social, positive rights derived from 
social compact such as: the right to vote, hołd office, the right to free election, the right not to be taxed except by 
consent through representation o f one’s choice, the right to be free from monopolies, the right to be free from 
standing armies in time of peace, the right to refuse military service on grounds o f religious conscience, the right 
to bail, the right o f the accused person to be presumed innocent, and the right to have the prosecutor prove the 
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They were existing positive rights protected by state laws, constitutions and the 
common law. They could also be regarded as rights o f the people before which the power o f govemment must be 
exercised in subordination, and as civil, social rights might be invented. But next to them was the sea o f natural 
rights and they m ight be invented too.
77 L. H e n k in ,  The Age o f  Rights, New York 1990, p. 97.
eral government into the state domain was exeluded. But precisely that could not 
be guaranteed as the Antifederalists’ consolidation theory tried to show78.
The Ninth Amendment was consistent with the Antifederalists’ theory. 
Any govemment was to be founded in such a way as to expressly reserv[e] to the 
people such o f  their essential natural rights as are not necessarily to be parted 
with19. What were those natural rights for the Antifederalists? For instance for 
Brutus they were the great principles o f the late revolution, and those which gov- 
erned the framers o four state constitutions... self-evident truth that all men are by 
naturę free. The civil society and the state was created as to limit the injury that 
that exercise of liberty in the state of naturę could cause to others. The origin of 
society was not to be sought in any natural right which one man has to exercise 
authority over another but in the united consent o f those who associate... but it is 
not necessary that individuals should relinąuish all their natural rights. Some are 
o f such a naturę that they cannot be surrendered. Brutus lists some of such rights 
all rooted in the natural right of liberty: rights o f conscience, o f  enjoyment and 
defending life.... and others which [should not] be resigned in order to attain the 
end fo r  which the government is institutecf0. The end of government was just com­
mon good. This was the classical liberał theory of natural rights belonging to the 
sphere of private liberty within which individuals have a right to do as they wish, 
provided it is not detrimental to others. If their behaviour did not transgress such 
a boundary the others, the government included, had no right to interfere.
Brutus, like the American founding elite in generał, must have realised, 
that any attempt to define the confines of the sphere of liberty of the Declaration of 
Independence and the Preamble as a key to the natural rights possessed by the peo­
ple, was impossible. These rights were limitless. Moreover, the notion that the 
definition of harm to the community was not ontological but socially and culturally 
construed could not be ruled out81. As such, it could never be completely codified. 
The extent of those natural rights could be tested only daily with the current defini­
tion of the common good as nothing more than the prohibition of injuring the oth­
ers. The people would engage constantly in the debate about the legitimacy of cer­
tain rights derived from the right of liberty. Yet the list of such rights was as 
limitless, as the human imagination82.
Such a theory of natural rights presupposed not only a theory of limited 
govemment but a liberał morał theory of the Constitution which entailed the rights
78 The Federalists’ tacit abandonment of the “enumerated powers” doctrine as a feasible concept conceded 
that fact. They had to tum to the business o f the rules o f interpretation, the field which has grown into an industry 
of its own.
79 H. S to r in g ,  op. cit., p. 2, 9, 24.
80 Ibidem.
81 This is a perennial problem of American constitutionalism. Is there a boundary between ontologically 
and socio-culturally defined rights, and if so, where it is. Who defines such rights? The courts, the representatives, 
or social movements? These are the questions which could not be defined by the Constitution. These are the 
questions of modernity stemming from the individualistic contemporary society, which limits the ontological 
notion of “human naturę” . See: G. B o r r a d o r i ,  The American Pliilosoplier, Chicago 1991, pp. 137-152.
82 In 1787 the meaning of liberty was difficult to define. It could mean public and private liberty, as 
Madison wanted it, the former referring to the right o f assembly or vote. The latter referred to as private rights 
included for instance freedom o f religion, expression, or movement. In: H. S to r in g ,  op. cit., p. 2, 9, 48.
of citizens to have morał rights, or claims against govemment. The republican the­
ory of the representative govemment did not have morał legitimacy to dispose of 
natural rights, which could never be totally listed. Thus the morał theory of the 
Constitution was inherently bound with the written text and the Ninth Amendment 
was a recognition of that theory. It was a clear-headed recognition of the inefficacy 
of the legał, positive provisions limiting the powers of govemment.
The problem of codification of natural rights woven together with social 
rights occurred in the State constitutions. They tried to contain the usurpation of the 
legislative power and included longer and longer lists of rights which were never 
satisfactory83. James Wilson, a foremost American theorist of natural rights re- 
marked that there are very few  who understand the whole o f  these rights... Enu- 
merate all rights o f  men! I am sure, sirs, that no gentleman in the late Cowention 
would have attempted such a thingM. In human communities there were many pow­
ers and rights, which cannot be particularly enumerated. A bill o f  rights annexed 
to a constitution is an enumeration o f the powers reserved. I f  we attempt an enu- 
meration, everything that is not enumerated is presumed to be given. The conse- 
ąuence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied power into the 
scalę o f  govemment; and the rights o f the people would be rendered incompletess.
One of the gravest political implications of the Ninth Amendment was its 
potential for judicial review in its most activist form. Madison and Jefferson con- 
templated that the amendments could be judicially enforceable. They seemed not to 
think that way about the Ninth Amendment. Enforcement had to be confined to the 
rights of the Eight Amendments or scattered in other constitutional provisions. The 
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the 
guardians o f  those rights', they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment 
upon rights expressly stipulated fo r  in the constitution by the declaration o f  
rights*6.
For Madison enumeration meant transformation of rights into positive law. 
The courts could exercise them87. It would follow that not being positive ław the 
unenumerated rights could not run in the courts Art III, sec. 2, clause 1 described 
federal court jurisdiction and stipulated that the federal judiciary adjudicated in all 
cases... arising under this Constitution. The “rights retained by the people” as not 
enumerated, would not belong then to the domain of positive law. A suit brought 
on such a right would lack standing. The Rights from the Ninth Amendment would 
exist independently of govemment or they would constitute an area ofno-poweru , 
just delineating the ultimate boundary of power of the federal govemment.
But even if we assume such an interpretation, these rights could be de- 
fended, as mentioned earlier, through political action. As such they could eventu- 
ally concem the federal judiciary provided that that action could transform itself
83 D. S. L u tz , op. cit., pp. 59-68.
84 Debates, ed. Elliot, vol. 2 , 2"1 ed., Philadelphia 1937, p. 454.
85 Tlie Documentary History..., vol. 2, p. 388; also: Annals o f  Congress, vol. 1, pp. 731-732.
86 Annals o f  Congress..., p. 440.
87 See L. D u n b  a r, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, “Virginia Law Review” 1956, vol. 42, p. 643.
88 Ibidem, p. 641.
into legislative enactment. But even if such a political action did not transform 
itself into legislative enactment the judiciary could define and defend the rights 
defined politically. “Brown vs. Board of Education” of 1954, is a major modem 
example. In such a situation the decision could stand only as long as it had political 
support, if the institutions created to express the people’s will, Congress or Presi­
dent, were blocked.
Thus the unenumerated Ninth Amendment rights opened a possibility that 
the people could challenge any govemmental policy on the basis of unlimited 
rights. The challenge to Congress, for instance that it was abusing the “necessary 
and proper” clause was a possibility. The Ninth Amendment could also be used as 
a check on state govemments which originally was not contemplated. That could 
be inferred from the inability of Madison to push through the Senate the resolution 
forbidding the states to violate the eąual rights o f conscience... freedom o f the 
press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases... [sińce] every Govemment should be 
disarmed o f powers which trench upon those particular rights... The State Gov- 
ernments are as liable to attack these... privileges as the General Govemment is, , 
and therefore ought to be as... guarded againsł9.
But the rejection could never mean that people had surrendered all their 
rights to the state govemments. For once, the state govemments ąuickly incorpo- 
rated into most of their constitutions the provisions very much like the Ninth 
Amendment. Moreover some of the rights in these constitutions were natural 
rights, inalienable any way. The lack of incorporation meant rather that Congress 
and the federal judiciary lacked jurisdiction to protect the retained rights against the 
states, The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War made such an 
incorporation possible90. Those unenumerated rights, according to the American 
revolutionary generation, seemed to reside in the self-evidence of human needs and 
values and were justified by human existence grounded in liberty, as defined in the 
Declaration and the Preamble. Such a justification challenged any policy of the 
federal or state govemment going beyond their powers and restricting people’s 
liberties.
Of those unenumerated rights the most fundamental and unlimited was the 
natural right of liberty operating as an all-encompassing check on both govem- 
ments. Justice William O. Douglas in Doe vs. Bolton of 1973 stated that the Ninth 
Amendment did not create directly any federally enforceable rights but a catalogue 
of the rights “retained by the people” including customary, traditional, and time- 
honored rights, amenities, privileges and immunities that come within the sweep o f 
“the Blessings o f  Liberty” mentioned in the preamble to the Constitution. Many o f 
them in my view come within the meaning ofthe term liberty9' .
89 Annals o f  Congress..., p. 435, 441, 755.
90 See: W. E. N e ls o n , The Fourteenth Amendment, Cambridge 1988.
91 410 US 179, 210, 211, Douglas added that the term “liberty” had a legał meaning only through the 
positivist language of the Fourteenth Amendment. But that did not preclude the fact that the potential o f the Ninth 
Amendment for the development of the judicially enforced rights in case the political system was blocked or 
perverted could not be denied.
The Ninth Amendment had a judicial and political potential of which the 
Antifederalists were not entirely aware. For once, it constituted a concession that 
the whole federal constitutional system was not so much a legally defined contract, 
but a system of “communicating vessels”, the balance of which was politically 
conditioned. To put it in other words, he who had the power, had the Constitution, 
that is the ability to impose its interpretation on others. As Lorenz von Stein re- 
marked in 1852: “whenever Constitution and govemment become involved in seri- 
ous conflict it is always the govemment which overcomes the constitution”92.
In the eighteenth-century America that meant essentially a contest between 
the federal power and the states for the meaning of the Constitution. In the prov- 
ince of rights it could mean that the rights retained by the people could be fought 
for through the states. The states could challenge federal power whenever it tried to 
go beyond the enumerated powers. Thus the Constitution gave birth to the States’ 
rights doctrine93. But the states could also be challenged by the Ninth Amendment. 
When the defence would tum out to be impossible through the states, the federal 
judiciary could be used against them. The judiciary would be an institution that 
could guarantee the “retained” people’s rights.
The understanding of the Ninth Amendment as a depository of unenumer­
ated rights stemming from liberty had far-reaching conseąuences. They were 
rooted in a liberał theory but contained an implication no one was aware of at the 
time. That implication turned the reading of the Ninth amendment upside down. It 
was based, in fact, on the assumption that the amendment could be understood as 
a guarantee against the government on the basis of “a generał right of freedom”94. 
But its exercise seemed to have no limit provided it did not harm the others.
The Liberał Theory and the Positive Action of Government under the Constitu­
tion
During the revolutionary struggle the concept of harm was based on the common 
law experience of liberty. The British concept of liberty was in fact narrow, practi- 
cal, impervious to the abstract notions expressed by the thinkers of the Enlighten- 
ment95. The same concept became limitless when it was based on the idea of liberty 
as a natural right. In America it was exercised in the context of the divided federal 
govemment operating on the basis of a written document. The concept of “harm” 
embodied serious substantive morał judgments and could not be neutral between 
rival morał outlooks. Because of that, liberty could be a sufficient yardstick for
92 M. K a m m e n , Sovereignty and Liberty, Madison 1988, p. 16.
93 It would seem that the Bill o f Rights and state rights had little in common, but the issue was also local- 
ity and the natural right o f pursuit o f happiness. Increasingly the issue was also the natural right of property that is 
slaves. The states’ rights doctrine was thus a process which knows no special habitation. It is a nomad, reviving 
whenever and dwelling wherever toes are trod upon or feelings severely ruffled by the exercise o f  federal power, 
[in:] M. K a m m e n , op. cit., p. 188.
94 See: Nomination o f  Robert H. Bork... Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Washington 
1987, vol. l ,p . 117.
95 H. vs. J a f f a ,  Liberty and Eąuality, New York 1965, p. 124.
demanding more rights than those specifically enumerated only if it could arbitrate 
cases of controversial value judgments. And that was an impossibility. In other 
words, what was liberty for Hamilton in 1787 was not necessarily so for William 
Manning or a slave in the South.
The concept of “harm to others” was thus not morally neutral. It meant that 
whenever there was harm to others, liberty restrictions were justified. It followed 
that liberty had to be supplemented by eąuity, which in tum would impose ineąui- 
table restricting policies on others. The implications of such a reasoning for the 
American constitutional practice was far reaching and unintentional. The demand 
on the federal government, for instance, to fulfil the liberty promise of the Ninth 
Amendment could be contemplated for the reason that someone would have to 
arbitrate between conflicting understandings of liberty. Moreover, in such a case 
the defenders and critics of a particular liberty would have to justify their positions. 
They would probably have to employ the additional justifying concepts of the 
American revolution, for instance equality, or pursuit of happiness96.
That brings us to the paradox of the Ninth Amendment. Initially construed 
as a check on the federal govemment, it opened up a possibility of that govemment 
acting as an arbitrator between conflicting rights derived from it. That paradox 
seemed to be written into the very thinking of the revolutionary generation. The 
concept of “no harm” to others in the revolutionary definition of liberty entailed 
necessarily eąuality and the Ninth Amendment could be looked upon as a means of 
positive action to realize it both against the federal and state power. The social 
compact as the constituting event of a free society presupposed the eąuality of the 
natural rights97. That was the message of the Declaration of Independence, the re- 
alisation of the potential of liberty. Rights were antecedent to all positive laws and 
as such they belonged eąually to all.
In that sense, the Constitution could be understood as having legitimacy 
not only because of its adoption but because it embodied the natural rights, the 
ultimate guarantee of which was the Ninth Amendment. But sińce people adopted 
inalienable natural rights as their code of behaviour, these rights not only had to be 
secured, but there were definite duties corresponding to them98. And sińce rights 
may be limitless, the corresponding duties could be limitless. There was thus not 
only a practicai problem of defming the rights in a concrete cultural and historical 
setting 9, but also the problem of arbitration and the boundaries of compromise.
With his concept of “property in rights” Madison addressed that issue in 
1792: A man is said to have a right to his property... [but] eąually said to have
96 This is a generał problem of liberalism, see J. G ra y , Liberalism , Minneapolis 1986, p. 53-54. That 
shortcoming of the American concept o f rights prompted Samuel Johnson in 1775 to comment sarcastically on the 
paradox of American liberty: “How is it that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of negroes” , 
[in:] Samuel Johnson's Political Writings, ed. D. L. Greene, New Haven 1977, p. 454.
97 See: H. vs. J a f f a ,  What were the 'Original Intentions' o f  the Framers o f  the Constitution o f  the United 
States?, “University o f Puget Sound Law Review” 1983 (Spring), vol. 10, no 3, p. 382-386.
98 See the contemporary, left-liberal argument C. R. S u n s te in ,  The Partial Constitution, Cambridge 
1993, pp. 138-140,338-345.
99 See: M. W h ite , The Pliilosophy o f  the American Revolution, New York 1978, pp. 185-228.
a property in his rights100. But then he added Government is instituted to protect 
property o f  every sort. For Madison a bill o f rights will be a good ground for an 
appeal to the sense o fthe  communitym . For Madison govemment, acting out of the 
pressure for the fulfilment of liberty could play an active role in promoting it. 
Madison assumed that there was in the Constitution a permission for the interven- 
tion of govemment, whether state or federal. There was thus a fissure in the Bill of 
Rights which was not only a barrier against govemmental action but because of the 
Ninth Amendment, it was also an invitation to its intervention, possible beyond the 
enumerated powers list. At this point there arises the ąuestion what was the mean­
ing of the terms “common good” or “sense of the community” used by Brutus or 
Madison. Did they constitute an expression of conformity with the Constitution and 
the enumerated rights as they were or an expression of a potential that ultimately 
the sovereign people could realise?
If the former was the case then the ąuestion has to be asked who should de- 
fine these rights, who should enforce them and how should the deliberative process 
be structured. If the latter was the case -  how was the sovereignty measured and 
expressed? That was a dramatic ąuestion of the modern constitutionalism grounded 
in rights102. The American revolution was a rebellion against govemment and 
a rejection of the “natural order of things". It was neither naturę nor tradition which 
justified the political choices but they had to be grounded in deliberative discourse. 
For the first time in history the Constitution established a republic o f reasons... 
opposed eąually to outcomes grounded on self-interest and., on ‘naturę’ or 
authority103,where government was purely “man made” with recourse to natural 
rights. In that sense Revolution became a fu li scalę assault on dependency. Or, as 
Thomas Carlyle said, America was only “anarchy plus a Street constable”104.
The constitutional system excluded simple majoritarian politics. It worked 
both ways. It prevented the tyranny of the majority, but it also restricted govern- 
mental power. As such, the eąual distribution of liberty could not be guaranteed 
simply by a deliberative process of elective branches as was the case in England. It 
had to proceed by the way of the fundamental law; it had to have constitutional 
justification. Through legislative power as a way of distributing eąuality of liberty 
the sovereign will was in the system of separation of powers and checks and bal- 
ances limited105. The only recourse which was left was to demand rights through 
the Constitution. The culture of constitutionalism and the demand for rights would 
become for the Americans a powerful way of distributing eąuality of liberty. The 
Constitution as a standard of liberty was to be invoked against those who blocked 
the democratic process106. The Constitution justified by purposes it was supposed
100 The Writings o f  James Madison..., vol. 6, p. 103.
101 R. R u t la n d ,  op. cit., vol. 14, 1975, p. 162-163.
102 The idea was intimated many times by the thinkers o f  the American revolution. See for instance: Ch.
S. H y n e m a n , D. S. L u tz , American Political Writing during the Founding Era 1760-1805, Indianapolis 1983, 
vol. 2, p. 703; H. S to r in g ,  op. cit., vol. 5, p. 55, 269, vol. 4, p. 29, also vol. 3, p. 5 ,5 6 , 77-88, 118.
lo:! C. R. S u n s te in ,  op. cit., p. 20.
104 In: P. S. P a lu d a n ,  A C m enant with Deatlt, Urbana 1975, p. 15.
105 J. A p p le b y , op. cit., p. 220.
106 See: J. C h o p e r , Judicial Review and the National Political Process, Chicago 1980, p. 25-29.
to realise which enabled individuals and groups to appeal to it and to demand ends 
it was supposed to guarantee107.
The culture of constitutionalism and a pressure to distribute eąually the lib­
erty put forth in the Declaration, the Preamble and the Bill of Rights became 
a powerful substitute for the majoritarian, parliamentary politics. It made social 
energy focus on the Constitution and the war for its interpretation has became 
a major American sport, preserving democratic politics from war of all against 
all108. It was not the text of the Constitution which made it the vehicle of the culture 
of constitutionalism. It was that text in the context of the powerful anti- 
governmental bias of the structure of the US federal system of institutions and its 
virtual resistance to change through amendment that enforced a gradual channel- 
ling of all social, economic and political energies towards its interpretation.
The Constitution as a substitute of majoritarian politics caused that the 
fight for rights took on the character o f military manoeuvres in a fixed  terrain09. 
The Constitution understood as a legał text, was a “fixed terrain” . The US history 
has been the history of a strife for the meaning of the Constitution and the vehicle 
through which such an interpretation could be made110. It tumed out that the para- 
mount position in that process was acąuired by the Supreme Court for although: 
The past may be only a prologue, but fo r  the Supreme Court that prologue... ap- 
pears to direct the whole drama. The drama is the interpretation o f  the words o f 
the United States Constitution 11. That did not mean that the federal judieiary had 
to assume such a position, but it explains why it was achieved. The key position of 
the judieiary without necessarily deciding what its precise role would be was con- 
ditioned by both the text of the Constitution and the culture of constitutionalism 
based on rights.
There has always been a pressure in such a situation to depart from consti­
tutional text or the intention of the framers and to resort to the salutary fiction of 
the ‘living constitution’ as a substitute for amendment and the blocked majoritarian 
political process112. The federal judieiary assumed a role of a continuous constitu­
tional convention, including new and changing interpretation of the unenumerated 
individual rights113.
107 See: D. S. L u tz , The Declaration o f  Independence As Part o f  an American National Compact, 
“Publius” 1989 (Winter), vol. 19, p. 41-58.
108 There have been yet some who have minimized the impact o f the Constitution on the creation o f civi- 
lized American democracy. See: F. J. T u rn e r ,  The Significance o f  the Frontier in American History, [in:] An 
American Primer, ed. D. J. B o o r s t in ,  New York 1985, p. 544-546, 562-564; R. A. D a h l, A Preface to Demo­
cratic Theory, Chicago 1956, p. 143.
109 J. A p p le b y , op. cit., p. 225.
110 H. J e f f e r s o n  P o w e ll ,  Parcliment Matters, “Iowa Law Review” 1986, vol. 71.
111 J. G. W o f fo rd , The Blinding Light, “The University o f Chicago Law Review” 1964, vol. 31, p. 502.
112 The term “living constitution” gained prominence only in the 1920’s and 30’s. See: M. K a m m e n , A M a­
chinę That Would Go o fltse lf, New York 1986, pp. 17-20, 34, 140-141, 177, 397; B. C a rd o s o ,  The Paradoxes o f  
Legał Science, New York 1928, p. 60-61; O. W e n d e l l  H o lm e s , M issouri vs. Holland 252 US 416, 1920, pp. 
433-434.
113 The Constitution, the Courts, and the Quest fo r  Justice, eds. R. A. G o ld w in ,  W. A. S c h a m b ra , 
Washington 1989, p. 7.
The aforementioned issue in American constitutionalism has been framed 
as a problem of the source of norms goveming judicial review and expressed by 
dichotomies: judicial activism vs. restraint, or judicial activism vs. democratic 
politics, originalism vs. non-originalism or interpretivism vs. non-interpretivism. 
They revolve around the issue whether in reviewing laws for constitutionality the 
judges should determine whether the scrutinized laws conflict with the norms 
grounded in the written Constitution, or should they also have the right to enforce 
principles like liberty, justice, faimess even if the normative content of those prin- 
ciples can not be overtly found in the original text114. There was no way the judici­
ary could avoid the role imposed on it by the logie of American constitutionalism. 
As the custodians of the fundamental law based on rights the judiciary was pushed 
towards power bigger than the electorate itself115.
Such a culture was coupled with the feeling of unlimited potential and 
eąuality of condition, something which later was referred to as the culture of enti- 
tlements116. But to presuppose that the judiciary could get free interpretative role is 
misleading. The American constitutional argument in such a situation had to be 
a political argument. It was a participation in the ongoing constitutional convention 
where the text of the Constitution was a unifying mechanism of a pluralistic, rights 
and eąuality obsessed society. To presuppose that such a society would worship the 
Constitution if it had been just a legał contract to which the parties were account­
able as they were 200 years ago, obscures its role. In the American context, the 
Constitution has been a generator of culture and norms of legitimacy, with the tacit 
consent of all participants in the debate: the judges, the public, the federal and state 
institutions117.
If the values of the American polity expressed in the Declaration, the Pre- 
amble and the Bill of Rights could not be frozen in time, because by the naturę of 
things they were boundless and as such made constitutional which was indicated 
clearly by the Ninth Amendment then American constitutionalism, sińce so much 
has always been demanded from it, has to be a political discourse118. The larger 
ąuestion of course arises what has been the ultimate aim of the aforementioned 
values, all of them grounded as eąuality of liberty understood as no harm to others. 
Was that liberty understood as a libertarian concept? In America the aim of such 
a liberty seemed to point towards justice. Justice has always been a notoriously 
elusive concept in liberał theory. But in American constitutionalism it figured
114 The issue has a voluminous literature. See: J. H. E ly , op. cit., p. 1-2; T. C. G re y , op. cit., p. 703; on 
the conservative school o f “judicial self-restraint" see: A. B ic k e l,  The Least Dangerous Branch, New York 1963; 
R. H. B o rk , Styles in Constitutional Theory, “South Texas Law Journal” 1985, vol. 26; on the left-liberal, 
“judicial activism” school see R. D w o rk in , Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge 1977; M. P e r ry , The Constitu- 
tion, the Courts and Human Rights, New Haven 1982, p. 91-145.
115 J. A p p le b y ,  op. cit., p. 225; D. S. L u tz , From Covenant to Constitution, “Publius” 1980, vol. 10, p. 101-
164.
116 The Radicalism..., p. 230; J. B. W h ite , When Words Lose Their Meaning, Chicago 1984, p. 267.
117 A. C o o k e , America, New York 1987, p. 389; E. M a ltz , The Failure o f  Attacks on Constitutional 
Originalism, “Constitutional Commentary” 1987, vol. 4, p. 46.
118 Ch. W o lfe , A ll Too P o l i t i c a l “Polity” 1990, vol. 23, no 2; H. C. M a n s f ie ld ,  A m erica’s Constitu­
tional Soul, Baltimore 1991, p. 207.
prominently: in the Preamble, in the Federalists and the Antifederalists. Madison 
stated Justice is the end o f government. It is the end o f  civil society. It ever has 
been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the
-.119pursuit .
What Madison meant above of all was a procedural justice, the prohibition 
against the operations of the strongest factions. The extended republic would form 
a coalition of majority o fthe  whole society /which/ could seldom take place on any 
other principle than those o f  justice and the generał good. In Federalist 51 he reit- 
erated the point from the perspective of rights: In a free government the security fo r  
civil righ ts must be the same as that fo r  religious rights. It consists in the one case 
in the multiplicity o f  interests, and in the other in the multiplicity o f sects. The de­
gree o f security in both cases will depend on the number o f  interests and sects. 
Procedural justice was to be open to the force o f argument and to provide justifica­
tion for the decisions taken120. But at the same time it was procedural justice im- 
posing on the political actors the obligation of a pursuit of self-interest, provided 
they were really free and no one had concentrated power. The clash of those inter­
ests would be guided, constrained, and ultimately transformed by the regular pro­
cedural channelsm  created by the Constitution.
Those procedural pathways, argued Madison, were to ensure the finał ac- 
commodation among the most egotistic interests. When such accommodation be- 
comes habitual, public-spirited citizens would develop, which in itself was a guar­
antee of justice. The “rights” were thus somehow self-automata, providing that 
they would be acting not in alienation but through republican institutions in public. 
They would have to be somehow forced into the public realm. The task of the con­
stitutional system would be to secure eąuality of rights. The system was condi- 
tioned by the merging of public activities and private self-interests. The end result 
of that process was republican politics with civilized individuals122.
Public obligation would thus be a by-product of rights, man was not a citi­
zen by naturę as the ancients envisioned him to be. Political society was created 
artificially. Public education was conditioned on rights, and the duty towards the 
community was the result of their eąual and honest pursuit. Such a polity would 
produce justice1"3. That concept of justice was essentially harking back to the Ar- 
istotelian concept of “corrective or commutative” justice as based on private trans- 
actions of eąual men1"4. Such a concept of justice was close to the framers’ idea of 
eąuality of liberty as a capability of engaging in free transactions. It had nothing to 
do with distributive justice, but relied on the guarantee of fair game, that is eąuity.
The problem would occur if the political process belied the Madisonian 
impartiality. What if, for instance, the political process was an interest-group plu-
119 Federalist 52..., p. 324.
120 C. R. S u n s te in ,  op. cit., pp. 23-24.
121 R. A. G o ld w in , Why Blacks, Wonien, andJew s Are N ot M entioned in the Constitution, Washington 
1990, p. 67.
122 The Morał Foundations ofthe American Republic, ed. R. H. H o rw itz , Charlottesville 1986, pp. 75-108.
123 M. F a r ra n d ,  op. cit., vol. 1, p. 134; R. A. G o ld w in , op. cit., p. 64.
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ralism which destroyed deliberative democracy? What if the reąuirements of natu­
ral rights were in conflict with the practical results of the deliberative process? 
What was deliberative process? Did the Constitution licence any forms of public 
debate over the common good or are particular types of public decisions excluded 
by it? For Madison religious freedom could not be denied by any deliberative proc­
ess'25. But could the natural right to liberty be compromised by the political ar- 
rangement? Madison accepted slavery as an example of such an arrangement. For 
the sake of the common good of the union of which the slave owners were a part 
and the right of property Madison granted the right to liberty, out of political expe- 
dience, only to citizens, denying them to men, that is slaves. Madison or Jefferson 
did not close the door to the eąuality of natural right to liberty for slaves. He never 
denied their humanity but adopted a compromise, to check eąuality in liberty in the 
name of social concord126.
But the Madisonian theory of the extended republic as a guarantee of im- 
partiality ran into another difficulty at the national level. It was against the logie of 
the American blocked constitutional system127. Thus Madison’s doubt was not only 
that the extended republic might not provide eąuality of liberty at the federal level. 
It might prevent tyranny of the majority, but the plan will neither effectually an- 
swer its national object nor prevent the local mischief which every where excite 
disgust against the state govemmentsm .
For Madison the danger was that the federal govemment would be unable 
to guarantee security of rights in the states. The effective barrier to oppressive ma- 
jorities in the states was the federal veto on state laws which was the way of pro- 
viding justice and which Madison thought was not provided in the Constitution. 
What Madison was saying was that the eąuality of liberty might reąuire a positive 
exertion of power, this time by the federal govemment129. That the govemment 
sometimes might force solutions stemming from natural rights of the Declaration 
and the Bill of Rights, especially the Ninth Amendment. As such the federal gov- 
ernment had to formulate again what was the proper relationship between liberty 
and power. The flight from govemment that is from power for the preservation of 
liberty for all might not be enough. The natural right of liberty as the end of the
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negative liberty from interference by outside authority. Positive liberty was a form of power, to achieve liberty 
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republic could require a cali for power in the name of liberty. It was a radical 
change of the revolutionary logie of the relationship between power and liberty. 
But it took two generations to implement it; in practice it happened after the Civil 
War130.
Such a development was not inconsistent with the understanding of the 
Ninth Amendment. Not only did it prevent the political power to trampie on liberty 
but it also implied the opposite power sińce “rights” retained by the people in the 
eighteenth century also meant “power”. It could include the right of the federal 
govemment to use power against the states to fulfil the end of government as for- 
mulated in the Declaration of Independence, the equal distribution of liberty. The 
Ninth Amendment meant the retention by the people of rights not enumerated in 
the Constitution. But sińce “right” was eąuated with “power”, people could use it 
to delegate power to any govemment, including the national one, the right to guar­
antee the right of eąuality of liberty. The Americans in the eighteenth century 
eąuated those two concepts, which was common practice in the West for a long 
time.
When the concept of an individual right was first formulated by nomi- 
nalists in the fourteenth century, it was William Ockham who provided the first... 
systematic account o f subjective rights and who also elucidated the notion o /ius in 
something by using the word potestas131. In 1402 Chancellor of the University of 
Paris Jean Gerson wrote in “De Vita Spirituali Animae”, that ius is a dispositional 
facultas or power... appropriate to someone and in accordance with right reason. 
In 1651, Hobbes in his Leviathan also declared that the right of naturę is the liberty 
each man hath, to use his own power, as he will him self32. Also Blackstone, basing 
his ideas on Burlamagui stated that natural liberty consists properly in a power o f 
acting as one thinks fit, without any... control, unless by the law o f  naturę... every 
man, when he enters into society, gives up a part o f his natural liberty... receiving 
the advantages of... the community... Political... or civil liberty, which is that o f  
a member o f society, is no other than natural liberty so fa r  restrained by human 
laws... as is necessary... fo r  the generał advantage o f the public. But Blackstone 
conceded that if the law... [would do] mischief to his fellow citizens... [/f] is... 
a tyranny, the natural right gives power to act133. For Americans thus right meant 
a power to act, to do right.
In the eighteenth century such an understanding of the Ninth Amendment 
where it eąuated right with power was dormant, but it was going to be a sleeping 
giant of the American constitutional law. As the first revolution invoked the right 
of liberty, the second constitutional revolution of 1860-65 invoked the right of 
eąuality of liberty. It was Abraham Lincoln who made the connection possible. By
130 R. T u c k , Natural Rights Theories, Cambridge 1979, pp. 22-23.
131 Ibidem, p. 25, 130.
132 W. B la c k s to n e ,  op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 121-122.
133 Ultimately, it was citizenship and not federalism that became the defming power o f American identity. 
Federalism was one of the ways o f implementing it. But in the end the shape o f federalism was defined by citizen­
ship grounded in equality o f liberty. Tliere were, problems with the concept o f natural rights grounded in freedom 
as limitless derived from the state o f naturę.
the political will of his presidency he established the natural rights of the Declara­
tion as the constitutional rights. He took upon himself the task of politically defin- 
ing them and prompted the enactment of the Civil Rights amendments which paved 
the way for the judicial enforcement of the natural rights of the Ninth Amend­
ments. That pertained especially to the due-process clause. It was a legał revolu- 
tion, a reassertion that the states were also bound by the natural rights which could 
be imposed on them, this time by the federal govemment.
The issue, to be sure, had a dangerous potential. But the constitutional his­
tory went towards such a development through an additional legitimisation of "im- 
plied powers” doctrine anyway through the extension of the federal power, espe­
cially of judicial review. It was first exercised against the state and then national 
govemment and it was dormant in the Bill of Rights from the beginning. Thus the 
Bill of Rights, especially the Ninth Amendment, had paved the way to the creation 
of the enormous power of the federal judiciary, especially judicial review of federal 
power. The role of the Bill of Rights in the creation of that institution, whatever the 
intentions of its authors, cannot thus be overlooked.
